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This paper proposes a measure to assess the monetary policy for a highly inﬂationary small open
economy: Turkey. The empirical evidence suggests that positive innovations in the spread between
the Central Bank’s interbank interest rate and the depreciation rate of the local currency mimic
the properties of the tight monetary policy. These innovations, when they are positive, decrease
income and prices, and appreciate the local currency. For prices and the exchange rate, the eﬀects
are permanent; but for income the eﬀect is transitory.
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There has been a considerable work on developing monetary models of business cycles.
There have also been extensive studies on constructing empirical measures of exogenous
monetary policy shocks. Most of these studies perform their analyses for developed coun-
tries (see Christiano et al., 1999 and references cited therein). However, central bankers of
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banks’ motive for monitoring their foreign exchange reserves closely. Therefore, the con-
struction of a model for developing countries may diﬀer from that of developed countries,
and central banks may use their monetary policy tools to accommodate these two policy
goals in addition to the ones that the central bankers of developed countries have. First, as
regards currency substitution, the public may avoid using domestic currency and prefer
using foreign currency to guard itself against inﬂation. Agents like to hold more of their
wealth in foreign currency than in domestic currency if domestic interest rates are lower
or if the depreciation of the domestic currency is higher. Second, regarding the level of for-
eign exchange reserves, central banks closely monitor these reserves in order to eliminate
the risk of speculative attacks or balance of payment crises. Reserves increase as domestic
interest rates increase (due to either capital inﬂows or the decreasing foreign exchange
demand of domestic residents) and decrease as the return on foreign exchanges increases.
Thus, central banks may use their interest rate and exchange rate policies to achieve their
objectives, by moving them in the opposite directions.
This paper uses a new measure to assess monetary policy when interest rates and
exchange rates are used simultaneously. In particular, this paper argues that the spread,
deﬁned as the extent to which interbank interest rates exceed the depreciation rate of
the local currency, can be used as an indicator of the stance of the central bank’s monetary
policy for a highly inﬂationary small and open developing country. Using the spread as an
indicator of a central bank’s monetary policy does not mean that the bank controls both
of these instruments simultaneously, but rather the bank may control one of the two and
merely watch the other. However, even in this case, the spread might be used as an indi-
cator of monetary policy. This measure is also robust when the central bank switches
between pure exchange rate targeting and interest rate targeting regimes. Here, the central
bank may cut the liquidity provided to the public by raising interest rates at a given level of
depreciation, or it may keep domestic interest rates stable and buy domestic currency from
the public by selling foreign currency at a lower rate.
This paper uses Turkish monthly data from 1986:05 to 2000:101 to show that tight mon-
etary policy is associated with the decrease in income and prices and the appreciation of
the local currency, but the eﬀect of monetary policy is not persistent for income. Turkey
oﬀers a unique environment for assessing the stance of the monetary policy. Firstly, unlike
some other central banks that merely watch markets (e.g., under a currency board), the
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) was actively involved in monetary policy
setting during most of the sample period considered, either by inﬂuencing interbank inter-
est rates or by setting the exchange rate. Secondly, Turkey has been experiencing a high
and persistent level of inﬂation without running into hyperinﬂation since the mid-1970s.
The average annual inﬂation is 52.3% for the period between 1975 and 2000 and 61.6%
for the period that is considered in this study. The high variability of monetary policy
changes and the higher level of inﬂation (or higher level of price level variability) make
the relationships between the money aggregates and the macroeconomic variables more
visible. Therefore, detecting these relationships will be easier. In other words, the proba-
bility of a type 2 error– accepting the null hypothesis when it is false – decreases. Thirdly,1 The data set is ended in 2000:10 to avoid the beginning of a period that has a series of ﬁnancial crises starting
with 22 November 2000 and continuing with 22 February 2001, 7 July 2001 and 11 September 2001, 3 March
2003.
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Fig. 1. Interbank interest rate and depreciation rate.
H. Berument / Journal of Macroeconomics 29 (2007) 411–430 413Turkey has relatively well developed and liberal ﬁnancial markets; in particular, money,
foreign exchange and bond markets operate without any heavy regulations that might pre-
vent the proper working of the market mechanism for the sample period under consider-
ation. Under thin markets, interest rates and exchange rates might move with the
initiations of a few speculators (or manipulators). If this were the case, then interest rates
and the exchange rates would not be representative of the relative scarcity of domestic and
foreign assets. All three of these allow us to assess the eﬀect of monetary policy and the
economic outcomes associated with it for Turkey in a reasonable fashion.
Short term interest rates, one of the policy tools of the central bank, cannot be consis-
tently below the depreciation rate. If this were the case, the agents would switch their port-
folio to hold more in foreign currency than in the domestic currency. Thus, the central
bank has an incentive to maintain the interbank interest rate above the depreciation rate;
otherwise the domestic money supply would decrease (when agents like to buy foreign
exchange from the central bank) at the expense of the central bank’s foreign exchange
reserves until the domestic interest rates increase and (or) depreciation rates decrease.2
Fig. 1 plots the monthly depreciation rate and the interbank interest rate series. Except
for a few ﬁnancial crisis periods, interbank interest rates are always above the monthly
depreciation rates. Using the interbank rate and the depreciation rate as monetary policy
tools and their movements in opposite directions to align the monetary policy is also often
perceived by the public as an indicator of monetary policy. This can be observed by news-
paper columnists like Gokce (2001) and Yildiz (2002) and even declared publicly by gov-
ernments (see VII. Demirel Government Coalition Protocol, 1991).2 Under the freely ﬂoating exchange rate regime, the demand for foreign exchange would increase and the
demand for local currency would decrease until they came to a state of equilibrium.
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we impose the constraint that increasing the interbank rate, which is above the deprecia-
tion rate, has an impact on the economy. This imposes the condition that the Central Bank
increases the interbank interest rate one-to-one for a given exchange rate depreciation, and
the tightness of the monetary policy is determined by how much more the central bank is
likely to increase the interbank rate above the depreciation rate. If these two rates are
entered separately, it allows the change in the interbank rate to be more or less than the
change in the depreciation rate, and this one-to-one relationship that is imposed is used
to identify the monetary policy. This scheme has some undesirable properties, as will be
discussed later in the text. The next section deals with the speciﬁcation of the model. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the eﬀects of the monetary policy and the last section is the conclusion.2. The speciﬁcation of the model
The identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of the monetary policy is not a simple task. The reason
for this is that actions of the central bank also depend on both the state of the economy
and the intention of the central bank for setting up the monetary policy. In order to isolate
the eﬀect of a central bank’s policy activities per se, the identiﬁcation of the components of
the central bank’s policy that are not reactive to other variables is crucial. In order to cap-
ture this (following Christiano et al. (1999) and the references cited therein), we specify a
vector autoregressive (VAR) model. Here, we measure the monetary policy instrument,
which is this spread between the interbank interest rate and the depreciation of the basket,
where the basket is the combined TL value of 1 US Dollar plus 1.5 Deutsche Mark.3
The VAR speciﬁcation includes income (y), the logarithm of prices index (p), the log-
arithm of the commodity price index in local currency (cp), the logarithm of the exchange
rate basket (ex), the spread between the interbank interest rate and the depreciation rate
(spread) and the logarithm of money (m). One measure may not capture the level of eco-
nomic activity properly. Following Bernanke and Blinder (1992), we consider an array of
variables to measure the economic activity to strengthen our results when the results for
each income measures are parallel. However, in Turkey only three of the variables that
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) considered as an economic activity measure are available
in monthly frequencies. These three income measures are the logarithm of industrial pro-
duction, the private sector capacity utilization rate4 and the logarithm of the number of
housing permits given by local authorities. The wholesale price index is used for prices.
M1 + Repo is also taken as the measure of money. There are two reasons for including
Repo in money aggregates: (1) most of the repo transactions were overnight, hence this
money aggregate was liquid; (2) agents prefer to repo their savings rather than open
deposit accounts since the repo rates are considerably higher. The Repo/Total Demand
Deposit rate was 9.54 and the Repo/Total TL Dominated Deposits excluding Repo was3 The choice of foreign currencies and their weights in the basket is declared by the CBRT. This is the basket
that CBRT follows for its operations.
4 Here, the capacity of utilization rate of the private sector is used rather than the total capacity utilization rate
because the capacity utilization of the government is more likely to be determined by political decisions rather
than by the current economic environment. The public considers the capacity utilization rate of the private sector
to be more representative of the economic conditions than the total capacity utilization is (see for example,
Aslanoglu, 2001).
H. Berument / Journal of Macroeconomics 29 (2007) 411–430 4150.47 in 2000:10. Hence, the change in interest rates was more likely to aﬀect repo than
other components of M1. Sims (1992) notes that central banks may use commodity prices
as an indicator of inﬂation when they set up their reaction. Hence, commodity prices are
also included in the VAR speciﬁcation. All the data except for commodity prices are taken
from the data delivery system of the CBRT (http://tcmbf40.tcmb.gov.tr/cbt.html). The
commodity price series is taken from the International Monetary Fund – International
Financial Statistics tape.
In order to identify the monetary policy shocks, the variables in the VAR are ordered as
(yt, pt, cpt, ext, spreadt, mt). This way of ordering is consistent with our basic identifying
assumption that monetary policy setup does not have any contemporaneous eﬀect on
income and prices, but income and prices do aﬀect the Central Bank’s policy reaction.
The way that the six macroeconomic variables are ordered may incorporate an extreme
information assumption – that policy makers know the current level of income and prices.
One way of avoiding this is to use quarterly data. However, the use of quarterly data sug-
gests that monetary policy shocks do not aﬀect the income level in the current period, and
this may not be true either. Not allowing income and prices to be aﬀected by the current
period is more reasonable for monthly data than for quarterly data. It is also reasonable to
assume that the Central Bank sets its monetary policy monthly rather than quarterly.
Because of the narrow time span for which data are available, we are forced to use
monthly data rather than quarterly data. However, Geweke and Runkle (1995), Bernanke
and Mihov (1998), Christiano et al. (1996b) and Christiano et al. (1999) indicate that the
inference they gather with quarterly data is valid for the inferences gathered with monthly
data. Ordering the exchange rate before the spread – implicitly assuming that the exchange
rate will aﬀect the spread but not vice versa in the same month – is also consistent with the
practice of the CBRT for the sample period we consider, where the CBRT announces the
exchange rate every morning before the ﬁnancial markets open and depreciates the local
currency against the basket every day with a constant rate in each month for the period.
The public knows the monthly depreciation rate after the ﬁrst or second business day of
each month, but the interest rate is subject to change every day. Therefore, for each month
the exchange rate and the daily depreciation rate are constant for the rest of the month.
The CBRT tends to change the interbank rate rather than the deprecation rate to align
the monetary policy within a given month. Therefore, we can place the exchange rate
before spread.
It is important to recognize that the exchange rate enters the VAR speciﬁcation twice:
one as an exchange rate, and the other as the diﬀerence between the interbank rate and the
percentage change in the exchange rate. This might be considered a problem. Here, we
impose the constraint that the diﬀerence between the interbank rate and the depreciation
rate can be used as an indicator of monetary policy, and we treat the interbank rate above
the depreciation rate as a variable separate from the exchange rate. Entering diﬀerent
interest rate spreads along with their components is also common in the literature (for
example Bernanke, 1990, pp. 56–59 and Friedman and Kuttner, 1992, pp. 482–483, Eq.
2 and Table 9), or the diﬀerence of a series along with its level can be used (for example
Bernanke, 1983).
The data set used to estimate the model includes observations from 1986:05 to 2000:10.
However, when the income measure is taken as the capacity utilization rate, the data set
starts from 1991:02 and when the income measure is taken as the number of housing per-
mits given by local authorities, the data set starts from 1991:01. The lag length of the VAR
416 H. Berument / Journal of Macroeconomics 29 (2007) 411–430speciﬁcation is determined by Hannan–Quinn and Shwarz information criteria, which sug-
gest that the lag length should be two. When the regression analysis was performed, each
equation had 12 monthly dummies to account for seasonal changes and 3 dummies for the
1994 ﬁnancial crisis: one for the month when the crisis occurred (April 1994), one for the
month before (March 1994), and one for the month after (May 1994). Repo ﬁgures are not
available before November of 1995; hence, a dummy variable for the period up until
1995:11 is also included. All the variables used here enter the VAR speciﬁcation in loga-
rithmic levels except the spread and the capacity utilization rate, which are entered as
rates.3. The eﬀect of monetary policy shocks
In this section, ﬁrst the chronological stance of the monetary policy that is suggested by
the speciﬁcation used in this paper will be focused upon. Next, the eﬀect of monetary pol-
icy shocks on various aggregates will be analyzed.3.1. Developments in monetary policy
Fig. 2 plots the cumulative sum of spread innovation when the industrial production is
taken as the income measure. Here, downward movements represent monetary easing, and
upward movements represent monetary tightness. Fig. 2 suggests that loose monetary pol-
icy could be observed during the period from 1986:05 to 1987:12, when Turkey had a series
of elections which made it likely that the government would implement loose monetary
policies [Sayan and Berument (1997) and Ergun (2000) give the political business cycles1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
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Fig. 2. Implied stance of monetary policy: Accumulated summation of spread innovations.
H. Berument / Journal of Macroeconomics 29 (2007) 411–430 417in Turkey]. These elections were local elections for the empty seats in Parliament on Sep-
tember 28, 1986; municipality elections on June 8, 1987; the Constitutional Referendum on
September 8, 1987; and general elections on November 29, 1987. It is quite likely that the
Central Bank adopted loose monetary policy on those days also because it has less inde-
pendence from the government (see Berument and Neyapti, 1999). The second O¨zal Gov-
ernment got the conﬁdence vote from Parliament on December 30, 1987 and this could be
the date that indicates the beginning of the tight monetary policy, which was implemented
until October 1989, except for the period that precedes the municipal elections on March
26, 1989. In mid-1989, municipal elections were scheduled for June 1990: a loose monetary
policy can be seen from the graph. After June 1990, tight monetary policy was imple-
mented. Once Prime Minister O¨zal took the oﬃce of the Presidency, Mr. Mesut Yılmaz
was elected to be the leader of the Motherland Party and became Prime Minister in June
of 1991. He then called for early elections on November 7, 1991 and from the ﬁgure loose
monetary policy can easily be observed until election day. As a result of the election, Mr.
Yılmaz lost and Mr. Demirel formed the new cabinet. Fig. 2 also suggests that a tight
monetary policy was implemented until April 1993 when the President O¨zal died and
Mr. Demirel took the oﬃce of the Presidency. When Ms. C¸iller became the Prime Minister
on June 13, 1993, she publicly announced that she would like to decrease interest rates to
boost the economy and a loose monetary policy can clearly be observed in the ﬁgure until
the April 5 ﬁnancial crisis in 1994.
A stand-by agreement was signed with the IMF in June 1994; however, the agreement
was abandoned in September 1995 due to another call for early elections. For the 1996–
1997 period, the CBRT publicly announced that the purpose of the monetary policy
was to stabilize the ﬁnancial markets rather than control increasing inﬂation. Parallel to
that, Fig. 2 shows the execution of a loose monetary policy until April 1997. A tight mon-
etary policy started to be implemented after Moody’s credit rating institution decreased
Turkey’s grade from BA 3 to B 1 for its external debt. Due to the Russian ﬁnancial crisis
which hit in August of 1998, the tight monetary policy continued until the third quarter of
1999. After that, a loose monetary policy was adopted. The CBRT loosened its monetary
policy after the Marmara Region Earthquake on August 17, 1999, which cost around
18000 lives. It is interesting to note that this loose monetary policy continued even with
the implementation of the exchange rate based disinﬂation program in December of
1999. This is what is expected from any exchange rate based disinﬂation program com-
pared to a monetary based disinﬂation program (see Agenor and Montiel, 1999). To
sum up, the identiﬁed monetary policy and the developments of political and economic
events coincide well.
3.2. Empirical results
In this subsection, a set of empirical evidence on the validity of the speciﬁcation being
proposed will be presented.
3.2.1. Spread as a measure of monetary policy
It is necessary to consider whether the estimated impulse responses to monetary policy
shocks match the expected movements of macroeconomic variables. Economic theory sug-
gests that with monetary contraction, interest rates initially increase and monetary aggre-
gates fall. However, following an initial rise, interest rates may decrease due to
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levels decline and there is no increase in output level. It is plausible that monetary contrac-
tion brings about an output level decrease or a price level increase. However, as long as the
monetary policy is exogenous – monetary policy does not systematically respond to eco-
nomic factors such as inﬂationary pressure, excess liquidity demand and shocks from
the rest of the world – then output level and prices should not increase.
The system that is used here also includes world export commodity prices in domestic
currency and the exchange rate. A monetary contraction is not expected to decrease world
export commodity prices since Turkey is too small a country to inﬂuence commodity
prices. Under a ﬂexible exchange rate, it is expected that currency will appreciate in the
short run with the adoption of a tight monetary policy. Moreover, even for a small coun-
try, appreciation of the domestic currency may decrease world export commodity prices in
terms of domestic currency.
Here, the eﬀect of a tight monetary policy – positive innovation in spread – will be dis-
cussed. The ﬁrst column of Fig. 3 shows impulse response functions of industrial produc-
tion, prices, commodity prices, exchange rates, spread and money obtained when there is
one standard deviation innovation in spread. The middle line shows the point estimates,
the other two lines show 5% conﬁdence intervals.5 It is important to emphasize some of
the observations here. First, the innovation in spread is not persistent. After the third
month, the innovation in spread disappears. Second, the eﬀect of monetary policy is tran-
sitory on output but persistent in prices.
Tight monetary policy, as measured with positive innovation in spread, has a transitory
eﬀect on output. Output levels decrease for the ﬁrst 5 months even if this is signiﬁcant in
the ﬁrst two months. The rise in spread is associated with a drop in industrial production
following a hump-shaped pattern. This is parallel to the open economy version of the Fuh-
rer and Moore model (Fuhrer and Moore, 1995a and Fuhrer and Moore, 1995b) as pre-
sented in Walsh (1998, pp. 472–474), and consistent with the evidence on the US (see
Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Sims, 1992 and Christiano et al., 1996a). The second row
of column one suggests that the tight monetary policy permanently decreases the price
level.6 Tight monetary policy also permanently decreases commodity prices and exchange
rates. The evidence on exchange rates is parallel to Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Koray
and McMillin (1999) and Kim and Roubini (2000). One standard deviation increase in
spread does not persist and ends after the second month. The innovation in spread lasts
only for three periods and then cuts oﬀ. This may indicate that the monetary policy of
the CBRT is not persistent. However, it may also mean that uncovered interest rate parity
holds for a given level of foreign interest rate and the CBRT cannot or does not deviate
from it. Lastly, a higher spread decreases money, but this is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Column 2 of Fig. 3 repeats the same analysis using the capacity utilization rate of the
private sector rather than industrial production. The results are practically parallel but the
decreases in price level and exchange rates are not statistically signiﬁcant after the 11th and5 These are computed using the Monte Carlo method with 500 draws from the estimated asymptotic
distribution of the VAR speciﬁcation as done through the MALCOLM procedure (see Mosconi, 1998) and its
covariance matrix as described by Doan (2000).
6 Fig. 3 suggests that with the innovation in spread, prices decrease (in a diverging way). We also calculated the
impulse responses at longer time spans, in which the decrease in price level stabilizes and is not statistically
signiﬁcant after 40 months.
Fig. 3. Eﬀects of spread.
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measure of income. There is no qualitative diﬀerence from when the capacity utilization
is taken as a measure of income. Importantly, parallel to the overshooting model, when
capacity utilization and housing are taken as income measures, domestic currency starts
to depreciate after four months of appreciation (see Koray and McMillin, 1999). The same
thing cannot be observed when industrial production is taken as an income measure.
Hence, the speciﬁcation used in this paper to identify the monetary policy is on parallel
with what the theory suggests.7
3.2.2. Money aggregate as a measure of monetary policy
Traditionally, monetary policy has been identiﬁed with various money aggregates like
M0, M1 or M2. Earlier the literature, in particular, followed that pattern (see for example
Barro, 1977 and Mishkin, 1983). In this part, we will try to identify the monetary policy by
examining the implied response functions to one standard deviation shock to m as
reported in Fig. 4. Column 1 uses industrial production as a measure of income. An
increase in money aggregate increases industrial production for 20 months and it is statis-
tically signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst 9 months. An increase in money supply increases prices and
decreases spread. These are parallel to the properties of the expansionary monetary policy
and also parallel to the suggestions of Fig. 3. Moreover, there is a decrease in spread as
money increases. The eﬀect on the interbank interest rate of an innovation in money aggre-
gate might also be of interest. The calculated interbank interest rate (Spread + Deprecia-
tion) also suggests that there is a drop in the interbank interest rate for 2 months in a
statistically signiﬁcant fashion (not reported here). On the other hand, importantly, an
increase in money decreases both commodity prices and the exchange rate persistently,
and that is not what is expected by expansionary monetary policy. Columns 2 and 3 repeat
the analysis by using the capacity utilization rate and the logarithm of the number of hous-
ing permits as measures of income. The behavior of prices, commodity prices, spread and
money are qualitatively similar but exchange rate and income are not.
In order to take the innovations in money aggregate as an indicator of loose money,
there are some irregularities: An increase in money (1) decreases the income when housing
is used as a measure of income; (2) appreciates the local currency permanently when the
income measure is the industrial production and for the ﬁrst four periods when the income
measure is the capacity utilization rate; (3) decreases rather than increases the commodity
prices for all three income measures. Thus, we may argue that a positive innovation in
monetary aggregate does not demonstrate the properties of expansionary monetary policy
on exchange rate (when industrial production and the capacity utilization rate are taken as
income measures), housing and commodity prices.
3.2.3. Eliminating puzzles
Using the VAR methodology to capture the exogenous part of the monetary policy
changes has caused some problems in the literature in the past. The ﬁrst problem is that
the empirical evidence might suggest that innovation in monetary aggregates is associated7 We consider various lag orders for robustness in our results. As the lag order above 6 is considered, even if it is
not statistically signiﬁcant, positive innovation in spread is associated with higher rather than lower prices. This
may mean that the results presented in this paper are not robust against alternative speciﬁcations. Alternately, it
may mean that because of the narrow time span, the high lag order over-speciﬁed the model.
Fig. 4. Eﬀects of money.
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1992). Strongin (1995), Christiano et al. (1996a) and others suggested the use of narrow
money aggregates like non-borrowed reserves to solve the liquidity puzzle. Sims (1986),
on the other hand, suggested separating the money demand and supply shocks by using
an identiﬁed VAR model to address the liquidity puzzle.
The second problem is that once the interest rate measure is integrated into the speci-
ﬁcation, monetary aggregates no longer cause output in Granger’s sense (Sims, 1980; Lit-
terman and Weiss, 1985). This encouraged Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Sims (1992)
to use the innovation in short-term interest rate as a measure of monetary policy change.
However, this created additional challenges. When a tight monetary policy is identiﬁed
with positive interest rate innovations, it seems that prices increase rather than decrease
– price puzzle (Leeper and Gordon, 1992; Sims, 1992). Among others, Sims (1992), Sims
and Zha (1996) and Christiano et al. (1996a) suggest including commodity prices to
account for this puzzle. Kim and Roubini (2000) suggest using a structural identiﬁcation
scheme. The third puzzle suggests that positive innovation in interest rates is associated
with the impact of the depreciation of the local currency rather than its appreciation –
exchange rate puzzle (Sims, 1992; and Grilli and Roubini, 1995). In our speciﬁcation,
we do not have any of these puzzles.8 As a last puzzle, if the uncovered interest rate parity
holds, then an increase in the domestic interest rate should lead to persistent depreciation
rather than appreciation – forward discount biased puzzle (Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995;
and Kim and Roubini, 2000). In this study, we eliminate the last puzzle when the income
measure is the capacity utilization rate and housing. However, when the income measure is
industrial production, the exchange rate stabilizes after the initial shock. Therefore, the
elimination of these puzzles further supports the validity of the speciﬁcation in this paper.
3.2.4. Other money aggregates
Here M1 plus Repo is used as a money aggregate. It might be necessary to use broader
money aggregates; hence, M2 plus Repo (M2R) is also used as a money aggregate.9 Fig. 5
reports the impulse responses when one standard deviation shock is given to spread and
M2R and when industrial production is taken as a measure of income. An increase in
spread decreases income temporarily but decreases prices and exchange rate permanently.
However, the increase in spread initially increases the M2R but decreases it later. Even if
the initial increase is confusing, this increase is not statistically signiﬁcant.10 An increase in
M2R decreases prices rather than increasing them. This also supports the proposition that
it is not the money aggregate, but the spread that captures the properties of monetary pol-
icy. Last, we repeated the exercise for the other two income measures (they are not
reported to save space). The results are mostly parallel except that an increase in M2R
is associated with higher, not lower, prices.8 These puzzles are addressed in later studies; see Kim and Roubini (2000), Christiano et al. (1999) and the
references cited therein.
9 Hannan–Quinn and Shwarz information criteria suggest that the lag length of the VAR process should be one.
Therefore, the selected lag length is one when the M2R variable is used as a liquidity measure.
10 It is often argued that tight monetary policy increases ﬁrms’ proﬁts by increasing the ﬁrms’ non-optional
activities (see, for example ISO (2002)). Firms tend to postpone their investments and increase their bank deposits
in order to increase their interest earnings. Thus, tight monetary policy increases bank deposits and M2.
Fig. 5. Eﬀect of spread and M2R.
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In this paper, we argue that the interbank rate innovations, which are above the depre-
ciation rate, measure the stance of the monetary policy. To be speciﬁc, a positive innova-
tion in the depreciation rate increases the interest rate innovation one-to-one to keep the
monetary policy neutral. An increase in the unanticipated part of the interbank rate
beyond this one-to-one increase suggests the tightness of the monetary policy. However,
including the interbank rate and the depreciation rate separately – rather than using a
spread rate – does not impose this constraint to identifying the monetary policy. We allow
that the innovation in the interbank rate might be more or less than one to keep the neu-
trality of monetary policy. In order to account for this, we entered the depreciation and the
interest rate as separate variables in the VAR setting. Speciﬁcally, we estimated the 6 var-
iable VAR speciﬁcation that includes y, p, cp, ex, interbank rate and M1R. The ﬁrst col-
umn of Fig. 6 reports the impulse response functions when one standard deviation shock is
given to interbank rate and when the income measure is industrial production. A positive
shock to interbank rate decreases income initially but later increases it; however, they are
not statistically signiﬁcant. It is worth noting that a positive shock to interbank rate
increases prices permanently; i.e. the price puzzle is present. Moreover, an increase in
the interbank rate depreciates the local currency permanently; i.e. the exchange rate puzzle
is present. This suggests that spread is a better indicator of the monetary policy compared
to interbank interest rate within the framework we consider here. The second column of
Fig. 6 suggests that an increase in money appreciates rather that depreciates the local cur-
rency: this is also a puzzle. We repeated the exercise for the other two income measures.
(These results and the results of the other impulse response functions are not reported here
but are available from the author upon request.) Although, the results were mostly similar
for the other two income measures, the exchange rate puzzle disappeared, while the price
puzzle remained.3.2.6. Post-crisis periods
It is often argued that the self-inﬂicted 1994 ﬁnancial crisis in Turkey altered the work-
ing of the ﬁnancial markets (see Ozatay, 2000; Alper and Onis, 2003; Ertugrul and Selcuk,
2002). Therefore, we performed the analysis for the post-crisis era by considering the per-
iod from 1994:08 to 2000:10. With the positive innovation of the spread, income, prices,
commodity prices, exchange rates and money decrease for all the three income measures
that we consider in this paper. Thus, the results that we gather from the benchmark spec-
iﬁcation are robust. On the other hand, a positive innovation in money decreases capacity
utilization and housing, and initially (in a statistically signiﬁcant fashion) appreciates the
local currency when the income measure is industrial production.3.2.7. Impulses with re-ordered variables
Christiano et al. (1996b) discusses the importance of the ordering of the variables in the
VAR setting. If income and prices precede the spread, then this type of ordering imposes
the extreme information assumption. The CBRT observes these variables in the current
time period before it sets the spread. The spread is also used as the ﬁrst variable when
the monetary policy of the CBRT aﬀects all those variables in the current period. The evi-
dence gathered with the re-ordered VAR does not conﬂict with the benchmark
speciﬁcation.
Fig. 6. Eﬀects of interbank rate and money.
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The impulse response functions assess the dynamic eﬀects of monetary policy shocks.
Forecast error variance decomposition analysis assesses how monetary policy shocks con-
tribute to the volatility of various economic aggregates. There are two reasons for the
importance of the latter. First, it helps to assess whether monetary policy shocks have been
an important independent source of impulses in the business cycle. Second, it helps the
identiﬁcation strategy, which assumes that monetary aggregates are mostly exogenous
shocks to money.
Table 1 reports the ﬁrst 6, 12 and 18 step-ahead forecast error variances decompositions
in income, prices, commodity prices, exchange rate, spread and money as the percentage of
variances, which are attributable to spread. Table 2 repeats the same exercise as the per-
centage of variances, which are attributable to money rather than spread. It is ﬁrst neces-
sary to assess the impact of monetary policy (spread). Regarding the eﬀect of monetary
policy on income, it does not have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on industrial produc-
tion, capacity utilization rate or housing, which is parallel to Kim (1999) and Kim and
Roubini (2000). Moreover, for the three income measures considered, there is no statisti-
cally signiﬁcant variation in prices accounted for by the spread. Importantly, a large var-
iation of spread is also explained by itself. This supports the identiﬁcation strategy, which
assumes that the spread is exogenous and thus not explained by prices and output.Table 1
How the spread explains each variable
IP p cp ex spread m
6 0.41 1.01 1.07 2.47** 55.91** 0.83
(0.39) (0.86) (0.84) (1.19) (5.58) (1.37)
12 0.40 1.59 1.44 2.75* 55.10** 0.75
(0.37) (1.23) (1.21) (1.56) (5.58) (1.25)
18 0.40 1.81 1.61 2.73 54.75** 0.81
(0.37) (1.36) (1.36) (1.65) (5.59) (1.17)
Capacity p cp ex spread m
6 0.93 2.09 0.44 2.56* 58.85** 0.38
(0.77) (1.46) (0.67) (1.46) (6.90) (1.14)
12 0.92 2.28 0.47 2.66* 55.79** 0.62
(0.63) (1.80) (0.86) (1.80) (7.00) (1.33)
18 0.93 1.93 0.42 2.29 54.95** 0.84
(0.63) (1.77) (0.89) (1.80) (7.11) (1.40)
Housing p cp ex spread m
6 0.19 1.66 0.52 2.06 57.87** 0.22
(0.30) (1.29) (0.69) (1.28) (6.75) (0.87)
12 0.19 1.74 0.55 2.04 55.20** 0.37
(0.30) (1.54) (0.89) (1.55) (6.81) (1.00)
18 0.19 1.53 0.52 1.77 54.58** 0.54
(0.29) (1.51) (0.93) (1.53) (6.89) (1.05)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses under the corresponding coeﬃcients.
* Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
Table 2
How money explains each variable
IP p cp ex spread m
6 2.91 0.71 0.40 0.44 0.71 86.79**
(1.60) (0.84) (0.60) (0.58) (0.81) (4.86)
12 3.21 0.57 0.65 0.47 0.86 73.57**
(1.80) (0.98) (1.25) (1.01) (0.90) (7.23)
18 3.19 0.31 0.88 0.53 0.89 62.09**
(1.79) (0.47) (1.70) (1.27) (0.88) (7.51)
Capacity p cp ex spread m
6 1.24 2.61 0.12 0.01 0.58 89.75**
(1.59) (2.04) (0.43) (0.04) (0.82) (5.17)
12 1.32 2.50 0.12 0.04 0.66 81.41**
(1.80) (2.74) (0.67) (0.34) (0.82) (6.61)
18 1.24 1.74 0.12 0.05 0.66 73.10**
(1.69) (2.38) (0.75) (0.44) (0.81) (7.34)
Housing p cp ex spread m
6 0.02 2.79 0.06 0.13 0.58 86.58**
(0.16) (2.14) (0.31) (0.48) (0.79) (6.29)
12 0.08 2.63 0.09 0.21 0.60 78.49**
(0.27) (2.79) (0.56) (0.88) (0.78) (7.63)
18 0.13 1.80 0.11 0.18 0.60 71.05**
(0.30) (2.36) (0.71) (0.85) (0.77) (7.88)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses under the corresponding coeﬃcients.
** Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
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income (for all three income measures) and prices that are explained by the money aggre-
gate are not statistically signiﬁcant. In addition, a large fraction of money is explained by
money itself. However, as the time horizons increase, this fraction decreases.
An alternative approach to be followed in order to identify the monetary policy is to
impose spread as an identifying assumption within structural VAR framework. This
would allow the eﬀect of interbank interest rates on the macroeconomic performance to
be observed.11 An attempt has been made to impose that constraint and estimate the
model. When the constraints are imposed, the impulse response functions were not robust.
A casual observation of the likelihood function suggests that a possible reason for unro-
bustness was that local maximums were captured instead of the global maximum.4. Conclusion
This paper proposes a measure of monetary policy for a highly inﬂationary, small and
open economy. To be speciﬁc, innovations in the spread between the Central Bank’s inter-
bank interest rate and the depreciation rate of the domestic currency are taken as an indi-
cator of monetary policy. The empirical evidence suggests that a tight monetary policy,11 See, for example, Cushman and Zha (1997). They imposed a real demand function as the identifying
assumption where one could impose spread instead.
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which drops for a short period of time in a statistically signiﬁcant fashion. Moreover,
the decrease in prices and appreciation of the local currency are permanent. Here, the
qualitative inferences concerning the eﬀect of monetary policy are on parallel with the dif-
ferent speciﬁcation models used in the previous studies (see Sims, 1992; Eichenbaum and
Evans, 1995; Grilli and Roubini, 1995; Kim and Roubini, 2000).
The recursive system used in this paper produced impulse response functions that are
not inconsistent with widely accepted views on the qualitative impact of a monetary policy
shock on various macroeconomic variables. The absence of the price, liquidity and
exchange rate puzzles discussed in the previous section also suggests that the proposed
macroeconomic variable used here as an indicator of monetary policy and the recursive
identiﬁcation scheme are not at odds with economic theories.
This paper imposes additional importance on the identiﬁcation of monetary policy for a
small open economy. Policy makers from small open economies have additional challenges
that are not present in developed economies, such as the threat of currency substitution or
the level of foreign exchange rate reserves. Hence, identifying the spread as an indicator of
monetary policy for Turkey suggests the interesting possibility that the same variable
could be used as an indicator of monetary policy for other small open economies.
There are several issues which are not addressed here. The inclusion of ﬁscal policy
could produce a more complete picture of the behavior of prices and output. There are
some periods when the CBRT used money aggregate targeting (January 1998–June
1998) and periods that targeted Net Domestic Assets (July 1998–November 2000). Fur-
thermore, the behavior of the Foreign Reserves of the CBRT is not modeled. The level
and behavior of foreign exchange reserves are important and closely monitored by the
public and the CBRT. These are areas to be dealt with in future research.Acknowledgement
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